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Abstract 
 
The creation of the  State of Malta in 1962 constituted a turning point in the uneasy, 
occasionally turbulent relationship between administrative and political elites throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This study outlines the concerns that exercised Malta’s 
administrative elite as plans were laid for the transfer of power from British to Maltese 
ministers under the Interim Constitution (1959) and the Blood Constitution (1961). It 
examines the role played by the Head of the Civil Service in the attempt to forge an ethic of 
political neutrality for the civil service of a polity deeply divided by partisan loyalties, as well 
as the claims and campaigns of the Society of Administrative and Executive Civil Servants in 
response to challenges to the status hierarchy arising from other professions in government. 
The displacement of the administrative class from a position of constitutional primacy, and 
the erosion of its status among the professions employed by government are indubitably 
linked. The fate of the administrative elite that ‘fell from grace’ as Malta attained statehood 
signalled the passing of the Island’s traditional order. 
 
 
 
A defining moment in Maltese administrative history 
 
The creation of the State of Malta in March 1962 displaced the Administrative Class 
of the Malta Civil Service from its commanding position in the constitutional order. 
This was a defining moment in the uneasy, occasionally turbulent relationship 
between administrative and political elites throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and into the twenty-first. The fate of the administrative elite that ‘fell from 
grace’ as Malta attained statehood signalled the passing of the Island’s traditional 
order, which rested on three pillars: British overlordship, the civil service, and the 
Catholic hierarchy. 
 
 This study outlines the concerns exercising Malta’s administrative elite as 
plans were laid for the transfer of power from British to Maltese ministers under the 
Interim Constitution (1959) and the Blood Constitution (1962). Secondly, it examines 
the leadership provided to this elite by the Head of the Civil Service, the Hon Edgar 
Cuschieri, and the Society of Administrative and Executive Civil Servants (SAECS), 
the staff association for high-ranking civil servants. 
 
 These are important issues: they account for certain contemporary difficulties 
confronting the Maltese public service - difficulties that are rooted in Malta’s 
constitutional history and its political culture. In particular, they help to explain why 
recurring efforts at administrative reform disappoint expectations. They portray a 
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situation entirely at odds with the popular view of civil servants as a cosseted, 
manipulative, unaccountable class that is hostile to democratic direction and able to 
defeat attempts at administrative reform. An alternative portrait is offered at the end 
of this account, one that demonstrates the strong parallels between administrative, 
ecclesiastical and political leadership in contemporary Malta. The Maltese experience 
perhaps holds lessons for other decolonising polities.  
 
 This exposition’s perspective is political and constitutional. It belongs to what 
is perhaps the longest tradition of administrative scholarship, building upon Pirotta’s 
distinguished, pioneering study The Maltese Public Service, 1800-1940 (Pirotta, 
1996), as well as a tradition of administrative history exemplified by Chapman’s work 
on the British civil service.1   
 
 Some terms require explanation. The terms ‘administrative elite’ or 
‘bureaucratic elite’ are nowadays hardly used, and have not been conclusively 
defined. In public services that are modelled on the so-called Westminster-Whitehall 
model of administration, they are synonymous with what is variously called ‘the 
higher civil service’, ‘the administrative class’, ‘the higher division’, ‘the general 
service’. They have both constitutional and occupational significance. The term ‘the 
higher civil service’ is favoured here. At the time to which this study refers, the higher 
civil service comprised fewer than two hundred posts in the public service that were 
recognised by law, by administrative regulation, or by convention, as exercising 
formal advisory and executive authority, together with grades immediately 
subordinate to them, namely Principal Officer and Executive Officer. This definition 
includes chief technical or professional officers who discharge advisory and executive 
functions associated with policy formulation and administration. It implies, too, the 
distinctive collective or professional identity conferred on high ranking officers by 
their role in administering the business of government, the common pattern of 
recruitment and career development, and their common ethic. 
 
In so far as this discussion refers to the vocation or calling of administration, 
or the members of such calling collectively, the term ‘administrative profession’ is 
used in preference to ‘higher civil service’, which more properly refers to the formal 
place of senior officials in governmental affairs. 
 
 What concerns exercised the higher civil service as the State of Malta loomed 
on the constitutional horizon? Which of their professional interests appeared 
threatened by the new order of things? Three leading, closely-related issues stand out: 
• first, the establishment of a mechanism - the Public Service Commission - that 
would protect individual officers against political victimisation and insulate the 
profession from the vagaries of ministerial patronage; 
                                                 
* This article originated as an oral communication at a colloquium on Maltese Elites and the Social 
Frontier organised by the Department of History of the University of Malta in November 1998. It is 
part of a larger, comparative study of the higher civil services of Malta, Barbados and Fiji, 
Administering Lilliput: The Higher Civil Services of Malta, Barbados and Fiji, a doctoral dissertation 
approved at the University of Oxford, UK, in November 1997. 
1 Richard A. Chapman,  The Higher Civil Service in Britain, London, 1970; R. A. Chapman, Ethic in 
the British Civil Service, London, 1988; cf also Peter Barberis, The Elite of the Elite: Permanent 
Secretaries in the British Higher Civil Service, Aldershot, 1996. 
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• second, the definition of a distinctive ethos that could legitimise the place 
envisaged by the profession for its members in the governance of Malta, by 
diminishing suspicion and friction between civil servants and politicians; 
• third, the protection of the profession’s material interests in regard to salaries and 
benefits against the claims of other occupational groups. 
•  
 This was undoubtedly a defensive agenda for Malta’s higher civil service. Was 
there any substance to these concerns? The evidence emphatically confirms that there 
was, as became dramatically evident with the onset of the Emergency, the final 
convulsion of Maltese politics under British rule, in April 1958. 
 
 
 Prelude: The Emergency, April 1958 – April 1959 
  
   The issues that came to a head during the Emergency found their origin in the 
unusual circumstances of Malta’s colonial government. As Malta’s oldest governing 
institution, the public service predates parliament and political parties. Unusually 
among the public services of the states attaining independence during the second half 
of the twentieth century, it has been largely localised since the seventeenth century. 
Malta’s administrative traditions originated in four centuries of well-organised, 
generally benevolent, but alien and authoritarian government, first under the Knights 
of St John (1530-1798), later under British rule (1800-1964). Under both regimes, the 
civil administration serviced, supported and secured a large military establishment 
projecting power overseas. Senior officials were not politically neutral in the 
conventional sense of the term. As the de facto government throughout much of the 
last century of British rule, members of the Malta Civil Service sitting in the Council 
of Government or the Executive Council were visible, often controversial political 
figures, an established elite confronting a disenfranchised political elite claiming to 
represent popular aspirations and national interests.2 Pirotta argues that ‘Localisation 
removed the traditional pattern to be found in Crown Colonies and in India of a local 
elite seeking to oust and replace a foreign administrative elite, with that of a local 
political elite seeking to wrest power from a local administrative elite. Hence, the 
conflict divided the population, the public service and even families.’3 Maltese civil 
servants ran grave risks when imperial and local interests diverged. During periods of 
self-government especially, a servant of the Crown might be required by a Minister of 
the Crown to act against another branch of the Crown’s Government.4 When that 
happened, the civil service could not hope to appear neutral, as the Emergency vividly 
illustrated.  
  
  The drama attending the outbreak of the Emergency belongs to Malta’s 
national epic. It was a pivotal event in the history of the civil service, in that it brought 
to a head, without definitively resolving, issues in relations between politicians and 
civil servants that had simmered since the first experiment with representative 
government. One incident in particular - the notorious clash of wills between the 
                                                 
2  Godfrey A. Pirotta, The Maltese Public Service: 1800-1940. The Administrative Politics of a Micro-
State, Malta, 1996. 
3  Ibid., 435-436. 
4  Cf., for example, Joseph M. Pirotta, Fortress Colony:The Final Act, 1945-1964, vol.2, 1958-1961, 
Malta, 2000, 279. 
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tempestuous Prime Minister, Dom Mintoff,5 and his hand-picked Commissioner of 
Police, Vivian de Grey over the use of force to disperse rioters - may have confirmed 
in the minds of politicians of all stripes their worst doubts about the loyalty of civil 
servants. Commissioner de Gray’s account of his telephonic confrontation with Prime 
Minister Mintoff rehearsed the issues at stake on both sides: 
  
 ‘I told him that ... he had no power to instruct me not to take the 
precautions I deemed necessary, and that I would not take orders either 
from him to withdraw the mounted police or to forbid the police to use 
their truncheons when the circumstances so required. He replied that he 
was the Minister of Police and that I would be ‘on charge’ in the morning. 
I answered that he had issued a public declaration divesting himself of 
any responsibility for public order, but that I was still responsible for 
public order. 
  I maintained that I could not, and would not, take orders 
prejudicial to public safety from one who is inciting rioters, and that, as 
public safety is a Reserved Matter under the Constitution, I had been 
authorised by the Governor to disregard such orders... He further 
threatened me by saying that I would see whether I needed the Governor’s 
protection or his. I took this to be a threat that he would inspire 
hooliganism against me... He tried to bring in the angle that I am a 
Maltese, and ought not to have taken the direction of a British Governor 
against a Maltese Minister. I answered that he was a Minister of the 
Crown, I was a servant of the Crown, and that I had acted with the lawful 
authority of the Crown...’6 
 
The following day, the Cabinet formally advised the Governor to dismiss the 
Commissioner.7 The Governor refused his assent and, at the close of a stormy meeting 
with the Cabinet over this and the constitutional question, accepted the government’s 
resignation.8 With the declaration of the Emergency, and politicians no longer bound 
by the responsibilities and restraints of office, the position of the civil service 
generally, and of the Commissioner of Police in particular, deteriorated. The 
Lieutenant Governor reported having been ‘greatly exercised by the problem of 
securing the loyalty of the Maltese civil servants’, after the Labour Party directed 
them to withhold co-operation from the colonial administration.9 De Gray himself was 
branded ‘the greatest traitor that Malta has ever had’ by Mintoff, who spoke of 
‘settling accounts’ and ‘wreaking vengeance’.10 Mintoff artfully linked the 
Commissioner’s ‘betrayal’ with the fact that he owed his appointment as 
Commissioner of Police to the Labour Government: affective loyalties, rooted in the 
obligations of patronage, should take precedence over abstract conceptions of duty to 
the Crown. He also attempted to isolate the Commissioner and his closest associates 
                                                 
5  The dominant figure on the left of Maltese politics, Prime Minister, 1955-1958 and 1971-1984, 
paradoxically, he split the Labour Party in 1949, and precipitated the downfall of another Labour 
government in 1998. 
6  PRO (Public Record Office, London), CO  926/792 - Statement by Vivian de Gray. 
7  PRO., CO 926/792 - Secret narrative. 
8  Ibid. 
9  PRO., CO 926/847 - Smith to Huijsman, 18 September 1958. 
10 PRO., CO 926/847 - CO Brief No.8: Threats by MLP and supporters against the Malta Police 
Force. 
Journal of Maltese History, 2008/1 
 
52 
from the rank and file.11 The incident recalls Singham’s study of the use of ‘terror’ by 
politicians in small communities to secure bureaucratic compliance.12 
 
 Unfortunately for the higher civil service, its members’ loyalty to any 
authority would be doubted on all sides. The administration of government business 
relied on the public service: the Imperial Government needed both to reassure civil 
servants and to expunge any disloyalty. Thus, while the Governor and the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies assured the civil service that there would be no political 
reprisals, either then or thereafter, against anyone who continued to carry out his 
duties,13 the Governor’s Advisory Council took action to dismiss employees who were 
convicted of riotous assembly, or adjudged security risks.14 Heads of departments 
were given advice concerning the attitude to be adopted towards former ministers.15 
Civil servants themselves sought reassurance - individually and through their Society 
of Administrative and Executive Civil Servants (SAECS). The Society sought 
reassurance for the longer term by hastening two languishing initiatives - institution of 
a Public Service Commission and a salary review. The Head of the Civil Service, 
himself Maltese, directed a complementary initiative to formalise the doctrines of 
political neutrality, impartiality and anonymity. None of these initiatives was wholly 
satisfactory; their deficiencies created grave difficulties for the administrative 
profession in independent Malta. The Emergency demonstrated the vulnerability of 
Malta’s administrative elite, in a deeply-divided, well-mobilised polity, with 
economic reorientation planned and secularisation threatened under a new 
constitutional dispensation. The controversy, prevarication and political manoeuvring 
that attended the establishment of a constitutional Public Service Commission 
epitomised this vulnerability. 
 
 
 ‘Professional autonomy’ : appointments, disciplinary control 
 
 In 1958, while preparations were under way to introduce interim constitutional 
arrangements pending the definition of Malta’s future status, the Colonial Office 
regarded Service Commissions as hallmarks of ‘advanced’ constitutions: they remain 
features of contemporary Commonwealth government.16 Why? As political 
emancipation proceeded, elected governments attempted to influence the careers of 
appointed officials: the incentive to do so was greater, the greater the tension between 
them. 
 
 The matter of providing a statutory Public Service Commission to advise on 
appointments and discipline was debated in Malta as early as 1945, in connection with 
the restitution of self-government. Political opinion on this was inflexible, as it was 
with regard to similar safeguards for the judiciary and police.17 ‘Ministers,’ the 
National Assembly claimed, ‘were better qualified to exercise the responsibility for 
                                                 
11  Ibid. 
12  A.W. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, Connecticut, Yale, 1968. 
13 PRO., CO 926/792 - Smith to Huijsman, 18 September 1958; Report of the Malta Constitutional 
Commission, 1960, iv. 
14  Advisory Council Minutes 5/58 - 18 June 1958 and Minutes 18/58 - 28 August 1958. 
15  Advisory Council Minutes 14/58 - 8 August 1958. 
16 Cf. Charles Polidano & Nick Manning, Redrawing the Lines: Service Commissioners and the 
delegation of Personnel Management, London,1996. 
17  Sir H.A. MacMichael, Report of the Constitutional Commissioner, London, HMSO, 1946, 28-29. 
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advising [the Governor] without partiality than any permanent or semi-permanent and 
irresponsible body which might be selected...’18 
 
 The Malta Civil Service Association (MCSA), at the time representing the 
higher grades, was itself ambivalent: 
‘... [it] only favoured a Public Services Commission provided the right of 
membership was formally conceded to a representative of their 
Association. 
 
... They also pointed out ... [that]  the advice given by Ministers who 
would be animated by a sense of responsibility and accountability would 
in the long run be more likely to give equitable results than would the 
judgement of a body of persons whose sense of responsibility would be no 
greater and whose accountability would be less.’19 (emphasis added) 
 
The MCSA’s curious faith in ministerial impartiality seems to have been motivated by 
civil servants’ greater apprehension about their peers’ sense of fair play: the Governor 
had been advised, since 1939, by a statutory commission comprising five high-
ranking civil servants, only one of whom was not Maltese.20 In other words, the fears 
of biased or arbitrary treatment habitually evinced by the Maltese21 divided the civil 
service at a time when it was localised and largely self-regulating. 
 
  During the decade of troubled dyarchical government, those fears turned upon 
politicians. Staff associations complained of bias in appointments.22 When the Labour 
Government embarked on ‘Integration’ with Britain (1955), it was advised to 
establish statutory mechanisms to ensure that ‘the sole test should be merit’ in 
promotions to the higher grades, and to dispel ‘the atmosphere of distrust [that] has 
prompted some associations to contend that seniority should be the over-riding factor 
in making promotions...’23 The government temporised, emphasising the 
accountability of public servants to ‘the people of Malta’ and, not altogether 
unreasonably, citing the difficulty in securing an impartial Commission.24 
 
 Just before resigning as Prime Minister, however, Mintoff conceded statutory 
machinery to regulate the medical profession, as recommended by a visiting Medical 
Services Commission, and under threat of industrial action by the Medical Officers 
Union.25 The medical profession, greatly dependent for training and employment on 
the government medical services, had hitherto been regulated by the Department of 
                                                 
18  Ibid., 41. 
19 ibid. The Association (established 1919) represented the Higher Division grades until 1954, when 
they seceded as the Society of Administrative and Executive Civil Servants (SAECS). The Association 
collapsed soon after the demise of the Malta Government Joint Council (1968), the only recognised 
forum for collective bargaining. 
20 MCSA: Annual Report for the Years 1943/44 and 1944/45, par.127 et seq. 
21 A recurring theme in the Ombudsman’s annual reports! 
22  Examples in: Report of the Association’s General Secretary - The Civil Servant, Vol.1(5), 
September 1948; The Civil Servant, Vol.1(8), December 1949-March 1950; ‘Memorandum to the 
political parties’ - The Civil Servant, Winter 1953; ‘Appointments by the Maltese Imperial 
Government’, The Bureaucrat, February 1955. 
23  Commission on the Malta Civil Service, 1956: pp.45. 47; PRO: CO 926/1099 - ‘Malta: Discussions 
on the Constitution, September-October 1957’. 
24  PRO., CO 926/1099 - ‘Malta: Discussions on the Constitution’. 
25  L.J. German, Landmarks in Medical Unionism in Malta, 1937-1987, Malta, 1991, 44-45. 
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Health. There, as elsewhere in the public service, professional matters were 
inadequately safeguarded from improper administrative or political interference.26 
With an aggressive union behind it, the medical profession stole the march, as it were, 
on their administrative peers, by securing self-regulation of professional matters 
(through a Medical Council), as well as acquiring the protection of a statutory 
Advisory and Executive Board to regulate establishment matters.27 
 
 The terms of debate about the PSC altered as a result of the Emergency. The 
threats directed at ‘collaborators’ by the MLP induced the representatives of the 
administrative profession to seek above all protection against political vengeance. The 
Governor’s Advisory Council and the Colonial Office feared that they would ‘get less 
and less co-operation from the Malta Civil Service as time goes on unless we can deal 
satisfactorily with this problem.’28 However, the Council prevaricated.29 Sixteen 
months elapsed before the Governor appointed the PSC contemplated in the Interim 
Constitution that took effect in April 1959. At the time, the Society of Administrative 
and Executive Civil Servants (SAECS), a recently-established representative of the 
higher administrative grades, requested that: 
 
‘pending the appointment of the Public Service Commission, no 
promotions, with the possible exception of promotions to the very top 
posts, should be made unless based on seniority...[as] the use of other 
criteria would be open to misinterpretation ...’30 
 
 As happened a decade earlier, SAECS became ambivalent about criteria for 
appointment other than ‘seniority’: in Malta’s adversarial politics, ‘merit’ could 
acquire a political flavour. Several appointments followed, defying the Society’s 
protest ‘at the flagrant disregard of seniority.’ The government refused to assure the 
Society that no appointments would be made in the higher grades pending the 
establishment of the Commission, ‘on the grounds that it would be an abdication of its 
managerial prerogative.’31  
 
 In August 1960, the Crown’s discretion over public offices was transferred to 
the PSC. However, while the Commission appeared to have plenary powers over 
appointments and discipline, the Administrative Secretary, as the Head of the Public 
Service was then styled,32 retained an effective veto over its business, as well as 
controlling data upon which recommendations are based. Edgar Cuschieri, the 
incumbent, may have wished to maintain his considerable influence.33 
                                                 
26  Medical Services Commission, 1957: par.11. 
27 German, 46; the Advisory & Executive Board was abolished in 1977, and the medical profession 
brought under the PSC’s jurisdiction. 
28  PRO., CO 926/847 - Smith to Huijsman, 18 September 1958. 
29 PRO., CO 926/584-587 - Advisory Council Minutes 3/58, 4/58, 11/58, 12/58, 15/58, 16/58, 22/58, 
26/58. 
30  PRO., CO 926/1371 - ‘Memorandum on Civil Service Promotions’ - SAECS to Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, 28 May 1960. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Redesignated Principal Permanent Secretary in 2005. 
33  Edgar Cuschieri, Administrative Secretary, was reported to have had ‘very grave doubts as to 
whether [the splitting of Establishments matters between the PSC and the Ministry of Finance] would 
be feasible. He thinks that central authority will inevitably rest with the Prime Minister in all spheres of 
Establishments work.’ (PRO., CO 926/1031 - Campbell to Huijsman, 19 May 1961) 
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 The PSC became again the subject of argument when a Constitutional 
Commission attempted to devise a permanent constitution.34 In regard to the public 
service, the so-called Blood Commission was both fortified and constrained by UK 
Government assurances that a future constitution would provide safeguards promised 
to the civil service and the police. SAECS urged that the PSC should have, in addition 
to its existing powers over appointment, disciplinary control and removal, ‘executive 
powers regarding transfers, the content and conduct of public examinations and civil 
service training’ - matters that affected the fitness of an officer for promotion, or 
could be turned into disciplinary instruments by ministers. Furthermore, to avoid 
political influence upon the Commission itself, it ‘should be appointed by the 
Governor in his discretion after consultation with Ministers in so far as the 
composition of the whole Commission is concerned, and with representatives of staff 
associations, in so far as two of the members of the Commission are concerned.’35 
However, the Blood Commission declined the Society’s proposals as ‘rather too 
specialised a matter to call for any recommendations.’36 It recommended that the 
safeguards then existing should be entrenched in the new constitution, and that 
appointments to the PSC should be insulated from political influence.37 Unfortunately 
for the Blood Commission and for the public service, neither the politicians, nor the 
Society, nor the UK government were prepared to concede their respective claims. 
The attempt to devise safeguards for the administrative profession thus suffered the 
same fate as the concurrent attempt to define an ethic of neutrality: it was imposed 
upon an unwilling political class and an ambivalent civil service. The Commission 
skirted the obstacles standing in the way of attempts to reconcile the various claims: 
 
‘As regards procedures relating to promotions, particularly in relation to 
the higher posts, ... we should hope that with goodwill on both sides, 
satisfactory solutions will be worked out in practice.’38 
 
 The Blood Commission’s negligence allowed politicians to devise their own 
solution. In the event, the PSC found a tenacious adversary not in Mintoff’s bluster, 
but in the subtle diplomacy of the Nationalist Party leader, Dr Giorgio Borg Olivier,39 
who became Prime Minister in March 1962. The PSC, the police and the judiciary 
were the subject of negotiations in London, immediately after the elections. The astute 
Prime Minister secured a statement from SAECS to the effect that ‘in the existing 
circumstances, a change in the manner of appointment and of the procedure of the 
PSC is indicated, and that they unhesitatingly support Dr Borg Olivier in his 
representations in this regard.’40 Officials in London believed that the Society’s 
                                                 
34  The so-called Blood Commission was chaired by Sir Hillary Blood, former Governor of Barbados, 
who also chaired an official committee on the future of Britain’s smaller territories. 
35  SAECS: ‘Memorandum to the Constitutional Commission, 10 October 1960’, Colonial Office, 
1961. 
36  Colonial Office, 196126. 
37  Ibid., 25. 
38  Colonial Office, 25. 
39  Leader of the Nationalist Party and Prime Minister from 1950, following the unexpected death in 
office of the charismatic Enrico Mizzi. He served as Prime Minister in coalition governments between 
1950 and 1955, and between 1962 and 1971. He negotiated Malta’s independence (Sept 1964) from 
Britain, and resigned the Leadership of the Party in April 1977, following two consecutive electoral 
defeats.  
40  PRO., CO 926/1334 - Martin to Secretary of State, 11 April 1962. 
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Executive Committee had been ‘subjected to considerable pressure’ from the 
government and the Catholic hierarchy.41 The Colonial Office gave way on most 
issues, its resistance undermined by the Prime Minister’s persistence, by anxiety to 
avoid fresh elections and, perhaps, by exasperation with Maltese politics.42 The PSC 
would tender its recommendations to the PM rather than the Governor; it would 
merely be consulted about the appointment (though not the removal) of permanent 
secretaries.43  
 
 In the Independence Constitution, the Commission’s jurisdiction was further 
restricted to consultation in the appointment (though not the removal) of heads of 
departments, as well as the removal of permanent secretaries. Whereas SAECS 
envisaged a PSC that could protect high-ranking civil servants from political threats to 
their careers, delegating managerial authority to heads of departments, the opposite 
happened! Senior appointments were returned to the discretion of the Head of 
Government, while delegated powers were allowed to lapse during the ‘seventies. 
 
 In summary, then, Malta’s administrative elite briefly secured safeguards with 
British assistance - the Imperial government’s parting gift, as it were, to an institution 
that had served it loyally. But the settlement imposed upon Malta’s unwilling 
politicians invited them to circumvent or dismantle it. After independence, they began 
to ‘factor the public service into the strategies of power politics.’44 By means of 
constitutional amendment and administrative measures, they reclaimed the patronage 
withheld from them in 1960, and continue to enlarge their claims. The administrative 
elite itself was not blameless. The suspicions rife among administrators themselves 
induced in the representatives and leaders of the administrative elite a pronounced 
ambivalence about the very mechanisms that could safeguard professional autonomy. 
A similar fate awaited the definition of a distinctive ethos of political neutrality for 
public officers, though this took place largely in the confines of the Palace Secretariat. 
 
 
The administrative ethic 
 
 The task of framing rules on the political conduct of civil servants was 
undertaken by the (expatriate) Chief Secretary and the (Maltese) Administrative 
Secretary. At the onset of the Emergency, the administration had nothing more to 
guide it than Colonial Regulations which did not envisage political parties, electoral 
contests and ministers. The early local instructions took the form of a dry prohibition 
of political activities by civil servants, but it became necessary to modify these when 
the prospect of ministerial government returned. The Administration had been:  
 
‘subject to two opposed pressures from the Colonial Office - insistence 
that the political licence accorded to Maltese civil servants in the past - 
and of which they took every advantage likely to suit their book - should 
be brought more into line with UK practice; and a desire on our part to 
                                                 
41  PRO., CO 926/1334 - Gorsuch to Eastwood, 7 April 1962. 
42  The papers dealing with these negotiations (PRO., CO 926/1334) are replete with scathing 
comments about the Maltese. 
43 PRO., CO 926/1334 - Secretary of State to UK Commissioner (Malta), 16 April 1962. Judicial 
appointments also came under the PM’s jurisdiction. 
44  Public Service Reform Commission, 1989, 1. 
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ensure that political restrictions imposed should not unduly limit the 
reservoir of talent from which future members of the Maltese Legislative 
Assembly could be drawn.’45 
 
A list of prohibited or restricted activities was drawn up; the service was divided into 
‘politically-restricted’ and ‘politically-free’ groups.46 The regulations were supposedly 
based on the recommendations of the Masterman Committee in the UK, which had 
reported some years earlier. Perhaps it was for this reason that the activities classed as 
‘political’ did not include actions ordered by political parties against the Government 
and its agents, under the guise of ‘protest’ or ‘civil disobedience’, nor industrial action 
ordered by trade unions that might have political overtones. Both kinds of political 
action had affected the public service previously, and were to do so again in the 
‘seventies, ‘eighties and during the first years of the twenty-first century. Even then, 
the Administration appeared uneasy about the regulations and before long reviewed 
them, following consultation with staff associations and with the Colonial Office.47 In 
October 1960, the territory’s new Executive Council conceded a staff association 
proposal for an ‘intermediate’ category, that would be prohibited from standing for 
election but might be granted permission to undertake other political activities.48  
 
 More significantly, holders of ‘conjoint posts’ in the Department of Health and 
the Royal University of Malta were included in the ‘politically free’ category.49 This 
significant concession to the claims of the medical profession legitimated, in 
independent Malta, the traditional political activism of the medical profession, 
glossing over the potential abuse of public resources for electioneering in the high-
profile health sector. It was also unsatisfactory in two other respects. First, it made an 
irrelevant distinction between ‘administrative’ and ‘professional’ work in so far as the 
risks to society and to the citizen of biased government was concerned. Second, it 
opened the possibility that senior medical and lay administrators might be confronted, 
in dealing with politically active members of their staff, not only with the officer, but 
also with the political party to which he or she belonged.50  
 
 Another unsatisfactory aspect of the regulations was that they avoided 
altogether relations between ministers and civil servants: no guidance was given then, 
or subsequently, about what a minister might legitimately expect of civil servants and 
what directions a civil servant might justly refuse. The omission was all the more 
culpable in the aftermath of the de Gray incident quoted earlier. The reason for this 
omission may lie in yet another unsatisfactory aspect of the regulations, namely, the 
exclusion of political parties or politicians from the internal debate, though some at 
least had clear views on the question, views that contradicted those of the Colonial 
Office and the Maltese administration. Perhaps there were real difficulties at the time 
in making an approach to the political parties. Whatever the reason, the failure to 
consult the political class about the administrative ethic adversely affected the 
standing of the regulations and, ultimately, the willingness of members of Malta’s 
                                                 
45  PRO., CO 926/1370 - Huijsman to Kisch, 2 October 1961. 
46 Executive Council (hereinafter ExCo) Memorandum No.404: Political Activities by Government 
Employees. 
47  ExCo Memorandum No.512: Political Activities by Government Employees. 
48  ExCo Minutes No.48/60 - 11 October 1960. 
49  ExCo Minutes No.48/60 - 11 October 1960. 
50 See: ‘Nurse MP graduates amid controversy’ - The Times, 21 November 1992. 
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administrative profession to uphold the ethical ideal. On the threshold of 
Independence, the Maltese administrative ethic was both poorly-defined and insecure: 
neither politicians nor the higher civil service had a mechanism for resolving 
questions of conduct. Subsequently, in any conflict of wills, permanent officials 
invariably emerged the losers - their integrity tainted or impugned, their careers 
terminated abruptly. The bitterness left by these incidents may explain the poor 
morale of Malta’s higher civil service. It was not until 1994 that a committee 
representing politicians, civil servants and non-governmental bodies formulated codes 
of conduct to guide appointed and elected officials.51 Whatever this code may have 
contributed to the ethic of politically neutral administration, a law enacted without 
fanfare in 2004 effectively neutralised the constitutional prohibition on public officers 
standing for election to the House of Representatives.52 
 
 In short, certain factors encouraged antagonism among Maltese politicians 
towards the civil service and its ethic. The late attempt to formalise an ethic of 
political neutrality and impartiality contradicted habits of thought and action 
cultivated among the higher civil service as a result of its constitutional pre-eminence 
throughout much of the colonial era. More recently, political crises compounded the 
tendency towards intense partisanship that is a serious obstacle to neutrality. Incidents 
of conflict between ministers and civil servants, and the persistence of a bitterly 
adversarial partisanship, diminishes regard for the ethic of neutrality, and places a 
premium on the loyalty - variously interpreted - of officials. In those circumstances, 
far from being complementary, the obligations of loyalty to government and 
detachment from controversy conspire to embarrass senior civil servants. 
 
 Neither constitutional safeguards, nor the self-imposed ethic of neutrality 
compensated altogether satisfactorily for the vulnerability of the higher civil service 
to the newly-emancipated political elites. To compound this, its pre-eminent status 
among other professions in government employment was seriously challenged in the 
tense climate of industrial relations that prevailed between 1958 and 1962. 
 
 
Material interests: salaries, classification 
 
 It is impossible to fully review the various claims, campaigns and settlements, 
though they deserve attention on the grounds that industrial relations were at least as 
influential in shaping Malta’s socio-economic future as her party politics and 
towering political figures. Four events stand out during this period, all of which 
profoundly affected the interests of the administrative elite: 
• first, the abortive appointment of a Salaries Commission immediately after the 
Emergency was declared - the so-called Waterfield Commission - whose rapid 
                                                 
51  ‘Government sets up three commissions’ - The Times, 26 March 1993; Code of Ethics for Ministers 
and Parliamentary Secretaries; Code of Ethics for Public Sector Employees; Code of Ethics for Board 
Directors (Cabinet Office, 1994). The regulations on political activities were liberalised in 1992 to 
permit officers in executive and junior grades to undertake political activity ‘as of right’. (OPM 
Circular 2/92 - 14 January 1992). In 1993 public officers in all but the top five grades were allowed to 
stand for election to local councils. The sharp exchange between Government and Opposition in 1997 
over the transfer of a Foreign Service officer who stood for election to a local council in the interests of 
the Nationalist Party demonstrates that the issues of loyalty and neutrality remain unresolved. (The 
Times, 22 February 1997). 
52 Act XI of 2004: Members of Parliament (Public Employment) Act. 
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demise diminished the chances of an independent hearing for the claims of 
SAECS; 
• second, the commissioning, in 1959, of an internal salary and grading review - the 
so-called Elwood review - which remodelled the classification scheme and created 
a career structure for the administrative grades that lasted until 1974; 
• third, the concession to the medical grades of salary parity between the entry 
grade of Medical Officer and the administrative grade of Principal Officer; 
• fourth, the Lloyd-Williams Arbitration Award to industrial grades, which 
compressed the salary range cautiously opened by the Elwood review. 
  Four themes characterising industrial relations in Malta’s public service 
appear also in these events: first, claims relating to salary differentials and relativities; 
second, arguments advanced in support of those claims; third, the mechanisms 
adopted to settle questions of classification or compensation; finally, tactics and 
leverage for influencing policy. The remarks that follow are largely based on 
memoranda addressed by SAECS to the Waterfield Commission and to other 
reviewers. 
 When Thomas Elwood, lately Director of Establishments in the Northern 
Ireland Government, surveyed the Malta Civil Service in 1959, he observed, besides 
numerous grades, ‘an inordinately large number of small and even trifling 
differentials’.53 He anticipated that:  
 
‘Any effort to reduce the number of grades ... will be resisted. It became 
evident to me that for the most part each officer jealously guards his own 
position in the hierarchy ...’54 
 
To him this appeared pedantic or pretentious. To the Maltese, differentials signified 
status. Furthermore, however slender, they represented jealously-guarded shares of a 
finite national wealth. Within the public service, ‘differentials’ and ‘relativities’ 
represented the currency of a zero-sum game, replicating similar games in parish and 
national politics - ‘a race where the one aim of all the runners is that of catching up 
and surpassing one of them’, as SAECS put it.55 
 
 ‘Differentials’ describe the pay range within occupational classes or across the 
public service, commonly expressed as a ratio of the highest to the lowest gross pay. 
Within the public service they contracted steadily throughout the post-war period, 
chiefly owing to the activity of trade unions representing the lower grades. The 
administrative elite wished to see its pre-war salary lead restored.56  
 
 As salary differentials eroded, expanding government employment fomented 
competition over salary relativities, that is the horizontal relationship between the 
salaries of different occupational groups. In fact, relativities between the 
administrative grades and other classes overshadowed every other issue in the 
                                                 
53  PRO., CO 926/844 - Elwood to Huijsman, 18 March 1959. Elwood was engaged during the 
industrial turmoil occasioned by the Emergency. He produced four reports on the Malta Civil Service: 
the last three furnished the basis of pay, grading and pensionability until 1991. The civil service 
remained unaware of his first report, an informal, unsolicited, but thorough and perceptive review of its 
organisation. 
54 PRO., CO 926/844 - Elwood to Huijsman, 18 March 1959. 
55 SAECS, 1968: 21. 
56 Salaries Revision Committee, 1947b: ‘Minority Report by Mr S Mizzi, President of the Malta Civil 
Service Association’. 
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submissions of staff associations, in official reports, in negotiations. They led to 
disputes in which, invariably, the teaching or medical grades were protagonists.57 
General reviews of pay and conditions of service were not consistently sympathetic to 
the special pleading of what are commonly referred to as ‘departmental classes’.58 
Nevertheless, these made steady, occasionally spectacular gains against the 
administrative class. One measure of their leverage is the fact that their associations 
not infrequently secured ad hoc reviews of their claims.59 In contrast, the claims of the 
administrative class have invariably been examined within the framework of a general 
review. 
 The concession of parity between Principal Officers and the entry grade of the 
medical service in 1959 was a severe setback for SAECS:60 the doctors’ coup 
encouraged others. From 1959, the Society’s representations acquired renewed 
urgency. However much the Governor and the Administrative Secretary might assure 
it that the government had not conceded the principle of parity,61 the fact remained 
that the ably-marshalled doctors struck a notable blow against the pre-eminent 
administrators. The government admitted that the practice of relating the salaries of 
professional posts to ‘General Service’ salaries had:  
 
‘... given birth to false and unsound ideas about relativities between the 
two branches of the Service, with the result that certain Associations 
claim that the basic scale for a professional Civil Servant should be 
equated to that of a Principal Officer ... there is no natural or rational 
relativity between the professional Civil Servant and the administrative 
officer... 
 
 In the Malta Civil Service there is ... no direct recruitment to the 
Administrative Class... The [grade of Principal/Administrative Officer] 
will be reached by two or more promotions and usually when an officer is 
in the early forties after 20 or more years’ service. It is altogether a 
violation of logical principles to attempt to force a comparison between 
these officers and young men entering their career fresh from the 
University.’62 
 
Whether their views were enunciated by the Establishments Office, or by their 
Society, the administrative elite favoured a stable, intricate, finely-tuned system of 
inter-service relativities; professional classes sought to disturb the status quo. 
 
 What arguments were employed, in staff submissions and in official reports, to 
justify the status quo? Claims relating salaries to the cost of living were the most 
common. SAECS argued that rises in the cost of living bore more heavily on higher 
than on lower grades; furthermore, a progressive income tax burdened the higher 
grades, while social benefits supplemented low incomes.63 General unions argued 
                                                 
57 Disputes occurred in 1957, 1958, 1959, 1966, 1977-87 (doctors), and 1984-85 (teachers). 
58  For example, Commission on the Malta Civil Service, 1956. 
59 The Malta Police benefited from ad hoc reviews in 1955, 1961 and 1997; teachers in 1961, 1989 and 
2007; doctors from three reviews in 1957-1960 and in 2007.  
60  The Bureaucrat, June 1959. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Statement of Case, par.18-20. 
63  SAECS, 1968, 45. 
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precisely the opposite: rises in the cost of living disproportionately affected the lower 
grades, who merited proportionately higher pay rises. Their argument carried the day. 
 
 SAECS eloquently expounded the claim that administrators played a pre-
eminent role in government, for which they merited salary pre-eminence.64 It also 
complained that: 
‘... the body of persons expected to weld together into one unit the public 
service of Malta, to give it leadership and to be its main driving force, is 
being steadily relegated to a status of secondary importance.’65  
 
 To some extent, the Society’s defensive submissions were self-defeating. 
Having claimed pre-eminence for administration, SAECS requested less than its 
members avowedly ‘deserved’; having claimed a central place in government, it 
produced evidence of the miscellaneous nature of administrative work.66 In the current 
jargon, the profession lacked a well-focused ‘competency profile’ that could justify its 
claim to special consideration. 
 
 Claims about the intellectual selectivity and qualities of character of the 
administrative elite complemented those concerning its special place in governmental 
affairs. A rigorous open competition for appointment to the grade of Executive 
Officer was the pride and trump card of Malta’s administrative elite. The high 
standard of recruits - ‘much higher than that of most departmental grades’67 - 
maintained efficiency and probity in the Service. The recruits were not, nor intended 
to be, graduates; instead they served a long apprenticeship before promotion. Once 
again, however, the argument was not water-tight: the number of successful 
candidates fell consistently short of the complement. From 1955, as an ‘emergency’ 
measure that remained in force until the end of the century, half the vacancies in the 
grade were reserved to in-service candidates taking a less demanding examination. 
SAECS viewed the development with dismay.68  
 
 This gave urgency to the argument that the quality of recruits to the 
administrative profession would not rise until the civil service offered competitive 
salaries and promotion prospects. Salaries Commissioners reiterated it. SAECS 
acknowledged it: an embarrassing admission by an elite that took pride in the 
intellectual and moral calibre of its members. Reliance on recruits from the clerical 
service diminished the standing of the administrative elite in relation to other 
professions - doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers - whose credentials were certified 
by universities or professional bodies. 
 
 To sum up, numerous factors influenced the ‘private’, material interests of the 
administrative profession as expressed by its members’ claims concerning pay and 
conditions of service. In this matter, as in the debate about the PSC, the profession’s 
standpoint was essentially conservative. In retrospect, the arguments employed in 
support of the claims of the administrative profession were unsatisfactory. This may 
                                                 
64  SAECS, 1968, 13. 
65  SAECS, 1968, 17. 
66  Ibid., 79 - ‘the figures asked for by the Society are approximately 20% lower than the better salaries 
available in the private sector’, 82-86. 
67  SAECS, 1968, 2. 
68 Ibid., 62-63. 
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have diminished the leverage that could be exercised over questions of classification 
and compensation. Furthermore, SAECS had limited leverage by comparison with, on 
one hand, the large, general unions representing clerical, technical and industrial 
grades, and, on the other hand, the small, highly-disciplined associations representing 
teaching and medical grades. 
  
 
 
The deeper significance of the transfer of power in an emerging state 
 
 Clearly, as the last period of Governor’s Rule drew to a close, Malta’s 
administrative elite could not but look towards its own future with misgivings. The 
Emergency had propelled it into the vortex of political conflict, earned it the enmity 
of a major political party, and demonstrated the mistrust of another. The Emergency 
and the Interim Constitution had also briefly restored the higher civil service to a 
position of constitutional pre-eminence, a position from which its leaders might 
influence events in favour of their interests. However, at the close of those four years 
its constitutional prerogatives were abrogated, its constitutional protections eroded, 
and its material interests subordinated to the claims of rival professions or junior 
grades. It must also be said that, if the Blood Commission conceived the State of 
Malta, the administrative elite delivered it, through a difficult, protracted birth, to the 
political elites which became the State’s fractious guardians. However much credit 
politicians may take for Malta’s prosperity, it was the higher civil service that 
assumed the burden of administering the islands during the constitutional hiatus; it 
was the higher civil service which prepared and launched Malta’s first development 
plan; it was the higher civil service which contained the social and economic 
dislocation attending the conversion of the Dockyard; it was the higher civil service 
which provided the well-performing machinery of government that permitted a 
smooth transfer of power.  
 
Forces greater than the administrative elite diminished its ability to exploit its 
constitutional pre-eminence and this distinguished record - the heady pretensions of 
nationalism; the political power mobilised by mass-membership parties led by 
charismatic leaders; the growing prominence of influential professions, some new, 
others traditional, caused by the expansion of government activity and employment; 
the waning of British interest in its Mediterranean fortress. Did the leaders and 
representatives of the administrative elite recognise these forces and grasp their 
significance? Could a better ‘deal’ have been struck before the administrative elite 
transferred power to politicians? Were the arrangements devised to lead and represent 
the higher civil service appropriate in the circumstances? While it is not possible to 
answer these hypothetical questions fully, the following remarks bear consideration.  
 
 Malta’s administrative elite, like other governing elites, has a dual character: it 
is at once an element of the constitutional order and a profession. As an element in the 
constitutional order, the higher civil service was led by the Administrative Secretary. 
As a profession, the administrative elite was represented by SAECS. 
 
 The Society itself had a dual character: as a trade union it bargained on behalf 
of its members; as a professional association it embodied the dignity of office and the 
expertise of the higher civil service. However, its credentials as either character were 
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imperfect. As a trade union, it was barred from representation in the Malta 
Government Joint Council - the forum for collective bargaining between 1949 and 
1968 - by the Council’s constitution.69 It could not aspire to the dignity of a 
professional association because administration was unlike the learned professions: 
the higher civil service is not an autonomous corporation like the learned professions. 
 
 The Society’s room for manoeuvre was limited by the need to reconcile the 
administrative elite’s professed duty to public service with its private interests. Much 
embarrassment could arise from a clash between the profession’s representatives and 
the official hierarchy. One such episode occurred in 1961, when SAECS confronted 
the government over the depression of salary relativities against the Executive grades. 
Against Colonial Office advice, the government brought disciplinary charges against 
the Society’s Executive for levying banned trade union bonds, then barred officers 
posted in the Secretariat from serving on the General Council.70 The PSC rebuffed the 
government - but took six months to act.71 The Society expressed understanding in 
regard to the awkward position of senior Maltese officials - its professional confreres 
- advising the Governor on the matter.72 
 
 SAECS was undoubtedly ably led: its memoranda on a wide range of issues, 
including salary claims, are impressive documents. Between 1958 and 1962, it scored 
several tactical victories over other unions and played a leading role in the formation 
of the Confederation of Malta Trade Unions. Despite this, however, it remained 
comparatively isolated in the trade union camp. That, coupled with its commitment to 
pursue its claims by negotiation rather than strike action, reduced its leverage over 
Government. Beyond the bargaining table, financial stringency, constitutional 
emancipation, an adversarial political culture, social differentiation and general 
expectations of affluence coincided to defeat the Society’s claims. 
 
 What about the official leadership? Whether or not the title was used, 
leadership of the Maltese public service clearly devolved on a single office. For 
twenty-six years, the Hon. Edgar Cuschieri, CBE led the civil service in his 
successive incarnations as Treasurer (1943-57), Official Secretary (1958) and 
Administrative Secretary (1959-1970). He was a figure of legendary subtlety and 
influence, whose name still inspires awe among politicians and civil servants. Like the 
other great estates of the Maltese commonwealth - the Catholic Church and the 
political parties - the civil service produced a leader of exceptional stature and 
longevity, whose term spanned the decades of reconstruction, decolonisation and 
development. Cuschieri’s legacy has yet to be assessed.73 From the folk memories of 
the civil service and documentary evidence, his leadership appears consistent with a 
pattern common among great Maltese leaders. Many, if not most of the important 
                                                 
69  The Joint Council’s Constitution admitted four unions to the Staff Side: MCSA, the Malta Union of 
Teachers, the Malta Government Professional Officers’ Association, and the General Workers’ Union. 
Neither Government nor Staff Side was willing to change the constitution, so as to avoid splintering of 
the general unions.  
70  PRO., CO 926/1371 - Secretary of State to Governor, 3 July 1961; Resolution approved at an 
Extraordinary General Meeting, 18 August 1961. 
71  SAECS News Sheet, No.2/62, 30 March 1962. 
72  Ibid., SAECS Circular, 7 February 1961. 
73  His plans for the civil service under ministerial government are examined in Edward Warrington, 
The Making and Unmaking of a Great Estate: An Essay on the Malta Civil Service from War to Self-
Government, 1943-1947, Malta, 1994. 
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initiatives originated from him or with his blessing, and undoubtedly were fashioned 
to fit a scheme of things in which he was the centre and prime mover. He carried 
immense moral authority among the administrative elite. Like better-known figures in 
the Church and in politics, he excited intense emotions: the British, who trusted him 
implicitly, and valued his capable handling of the civil service during the Emergency, 
thought him to be ‘detested by his Maltese colleagues’.74 He had a keen eye for talent, 
and recruited some of the best officers into central departments - the Treasury, the 
Secretariat and the Establishments Office. However, he did not groom likely 
successors - much like his peers in politics and the Catholic hierarchy. He abjured 
collegiality and remained to most officers - including senior heads of departments - an 
awe-inspiring, but remote figure. He seems to have remained open to new ideas of 
management until retirement: for example, he approved ambitious schemes of training 
and computerisation in the late ‘sixties.75 Against that, the troubled industrial relations 
in the public service absorbed his energies.76 In short, while Cuschieri’s career 
exemplifies the benefits of vesting leadership in a figure of distinguished ability, it 
demonstrates, too, the limitations of the arrangement: the personalisation of the office 
and of its initiatives; the vulnerability to pressure, exhaustion and factionalism. When 
the pretensions of politicians grew insistent, as they did during the ‘seventies, 
Cuschieri’s isolated successors as Head of the Public Service found themselves 
unable to stand up for the profession:77 their vulnerability contributed to the ‘fall from 
grace’ of Malta’s proud administrative elite. 
 
 The higher civil service was displaced from a position of commanding 
influence as a necessary consequence of national emancipation. That diminished its 
ability to regulate its affairs, as well as affecting its members’ social status. These 
developments generated friction. The emotive disputes over constitutional safeguards, 
the loyalties and the ‘privileges’ of the administrative elite recall similar controversies 
concerning the Catholic hierarchy. So, too, the ‘fall from grace’ of the administrative 
profession recalls the traumatic transition of Religion ‘from lordship to stewardship’ 
in an era of profound social and political change.78 The difficulties attending Malta’s 
higher civil service and its Catholic hierarchy, its administrators and its clergy, during 
the transfer of power and thereafter signified the turbulent passing of the Island’s 
traditional order.  
 
 Taken together, the Maltese developments recounted here prompt questions 
about the conventional understanding of the ‘transfer of power’ as a territory is 
emancipated to statehood. Political scientists have tended to accept the view that 
power is transferred from the colonial power’s expatriate elite to the newly-
emancipated territory’s political elite.79 This view is reinforced by historians’ accounts 
                                                 
74  PRO., CO 926/846 - Huijsman to Melville, 17 September 1959. 
75  Training in public administration ( J.W. Foster, A National Programme of Training in Public 
Administration, Malta –cyclostyled -1970); automatic data processing (P.G. Grantham, The Future 
Development of Automatic Data Processing in the Government of Malta –cyclostyled - 1969). 
76  Edward Warrington,  “Administrating Lilliput: The Higher Civil Services of Malta, Barbadoes and 
Fiji”, D.Phil dissertation, University of Oxford, 1997, 282-285. 
77  For a full account, with comparative references to Barbados and Fiji, cf. Ibid., 1997, 349-413. 
78  M. Vassallo, From Lordship to Stewardship: Religion and Social Change in Malta, The Hague, 
1979, coined the phrase.  
79  Cf. Aleksander Pavković and Peter Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession, 
Aldershot, 2007. 
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of the ‘struggle’ for emancipation,80 by the domineering figures of the ‘founding 
fathers’, as well as by political rhetoric. The events reviewed here challenge this 
simple view, reinforcing and developing Pirotta’s conception of a three-cornered 
struggle among colonial, political and administrative elites. The administrative elite, 
which many new states rely on to provide continuity, stability, orderly economic 
development and social cohesion, may find itself contending with ambitious 
professional and business groups as well as with a newly-assertive political elite. The 
case study reviewed here brings sharply into focus the clues scattered in scholarly 
literature on decolonisation and development and, more recently, on the so-called 
‘transitional economies’ of Central and Eastern Europe: emancipation challenges all 
the institutions established under colonial rule – the civil service, ‘established’ 
churches, legal/judicial institutions, patterns of land ownership, land use and 
commerce, civil society associations, group identities and interests. Thus, the so-
called ‘transfer of power’ becomes an experience that profoundly dislocates the 
colonial polity, economy and society, setting in motion, as well as feeding on, a re-
ordering of the sources of power and the status of the power holders. 
                                                 
80  Cf, for example Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, London, 1989 on the 
British withdrawal from India/Pakistan.  
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